Friday, September 16, 2011

Nietzsche and Free Will

In our discussion of Nietzsche yesterday we took a close look at the parable of the lamb and the bird of prey. We understood it to basically mean that the strong are strong, the weak are weak, and it makes no sense for one to ask the strong to be weak and vice versa. It is in fact the slave morality that invents the conception of responsibility. Before, the strong simply were strong. They did not need to give an account if their strength, particularly to the weak. After the slave revolt, the strong held accountable for their strength.

This idea of being held accountable made me think of our discussion on Tuesday about freewill and determinism. From what we saw in Notes from Underground, the human being is essentially free. She resists every formula suggested to dictate her behavior. She will act irrationality simply to avoid becoming predictable. Does Nietzsche agree with this conception of the human as being free? If we look at the example above, it appears that he would say that human beings are very much determined. Those who act strong are the strong. They can’t help themselves or do anything about it. It is only after the slave revolt that they are given a ‘choice’ by the slaves. Nietzsche seems to be insinuating that this is actually a false choice. We have no real free will to choose.

It is strange, then, that Nietzsche is so interested in the ‘will to power’ or even a ‘will’ to anything. If Nietzsche is in fact a determinist, what could willing something actually do? One could possibly will some life-affirming principle, but one cannot will a change in one’s nature (i.e. insofar as one is strong or weak, etc.). The ‘willing’ involved in the life-affirmation process is not the robust sense of will that we usually think of. However, what we might consider a ‘robust’ account of will may just be slave morality’s corruption of the understanding of will. Perhaps a genealogy of the concept of will (along the same lines and the genealogy of the concepts of ‘good and bad’ and ‘good and evil’) might be in order.

I’d like to leave y’all with this question: Does Nietzsche provide a freewill or determinist account of the human being? Or are such categories simply a function of the slave morality and as such not appropriate to use?

4 comments:

  1. We posted similar arguments at exactly the same time. What are the chances?

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  2. I think that Nietzche will argue pro-determinism. It seems like he is saying that one does not really have a choice. I mean, it is not free will that determines the weak. It makes sense, right. The weak would never really choose to be weak. And since they could not become strong. They had a revolt and changed the meaning of "good" and "bad" (morally speaking). I think that you bring up a very clear point. Is there someone that disagrees about this because I really want to here the other side. If someone believes that Nietzche would not argue that we are deterministic.

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  3. Nietzsche, when describing the original state or nature of the human being, would agree that his character is largely predetermined. Given that we are not offered the choice, we have no option but to act according to our characteristics. However, when Nietzsche begins to talk about his philosophy concerning the will to power, I believe this is not a contradiction because he is operating under a different context, one in which the definition of human nature has changed. In his lamb and bird analogy, he is describing the original beginnings of our moral values. While he does ultimately claim that these are arbitrarily and artificially attributed, he recognizes the fact that they have become a facet of our daily lives. And so his subsequent philosophy will build on what it means to be a human in the present era; which means that he must incorporate an idea of the will. Therefore, in discovering the base foundations of morality, he is not throwing out the concept of will, though he does argue it is not real; rather he is operating under a contemporary understanding of the self, recognizing that it has become a "real" thing.

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  4. I agree that Nietzsche is saying that the slave revolt introduced the concept of accountability, and thus the ability to discuss the freedom of the will. However, if this 'free will' is simply an illusion created by the priestly caste, why does Nietzsche talk about a will to anything? What is the difference between the real and the "real"?

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