Friday, September 30, 2011

Heidegger's Human

I couldn't help but be struck by what I saw as the contrast between the apparent critique that Heidegger offers of the rationalistic, calculative mode of thinking (which one would seem to identify as the heritage of the Enlightenment) and the manner in which he defines the human being, which seems to me to presuppose or even paraphrase some of the classical Enlightenment concepts of the human.

For example, his very distinction of the difference between data and understanding, between the calculative and meditative varieties of thought, seems to me to be a rephrasing of the arguments of thinkers like Descartes or Kant as to what is unique about human intelligence: namely that we do not merely experience impressions of the world but are able to relate them to one another within conceptual frameworks that provide meaning.

Similarly (as I think I mentioned in class), the defintion of Da-sein as defined by the ability of a being to have its own being (or is it Being?) as a question presupposes the existence of a kind of intelligence capable of asking any question at all, which seems to me to be even more fundamental (chairs don't ask themselves about either being or Being, as far as we know). In summary, I was left feeling as if all of Heidgger's thought was less subversive or revolutionary than one would think. Then again, he was a Nazi.

Am I offbase on all this?

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