The Implications of Multiple Interpretations

Continuing the trend of Kafka-related posts, I ascribe to the belief that the door keeper is somehow related to the man. Whether he placed there by a higher power or created by the man’s own mind, his purpose is directly related solely to the man.

That being established, I interpreted the title to be temporal initially, but recognized the spatial aspect to it later. This gave the passage a sort of double meaning as I read it. The man stood physically before the Law, but he could not enter because of the authority – an aspect which can only be gained through power or a legal system. He also stood at point in time when he was without the law – “before the law” – because was not physically in it.

For me, this raises many questions. How is it that the country man seems to have a sense of moral right and wrong at least to the extent of understanding he cannot enter because of the authority of the guard? If it is temporal, what is existence before the law compared to it after? Why is the law so desired?

Regardless of interpretation, these questions have not been easy to answer – mainly because they deal with issues not directly addressed by the passage. However, though that makes them all seem tangential, they are actually qualifiers which could aid in the understanding of whether the realm described in the passage are part of actuality or a perceived reality in the mind of the country man.

Further along this line, it becomes a question of the significance of perceived reality and implications of a personally crafted law and doorkeeper versus that of an actual doorkeeper protecting the actual law. The interpretations are too numerous to list in their entirety, but the main ideas seem to be the importance of a self-made limitation on our own value systems versus our interactions and importance placed on the actual value systems that exist within our “world.”

I am sorry this is a bit abstract, but let me know what you think if you feel you have a good answer to any of the ideas I brought up.

Its all One...

I really fell in love with the idea that this passage is all really a psychological commentary by Kafka. I mean it really is genius, and somewhat in the trend of Plato/Socrates, who described other abstract notions such as justice as being in the soul (or one might supplement psyche). So if Kafka was really doing just this, he would have been following in a deep tradition started by the father of Western Philosophy.

When I first read this passage, I like most, saw the before as spatially, and I am still not convinced that it is not. Perhaps it is both temporal and spatial, who knows. While it is really relevant in the physical story, if it is all taking place in the man's mind, I think it is less so. My meaning is that whether it is before the man reached the law (spatially) or before the law was created in the man (temporally) either way it is an expression of the man being without law. This I think is extremely interesting.

Taken this way, the passage might be an explanation of the man who limits himself from reaching his own potential of creating his own "free" law by imposing a law of not being able to create "free"laws on himself. (In doing so, utilizing the law he sought, but using it to his disadvantage) Such as to explain why we follow others laws; becasue we tell ourselves we have no choice, when really, as free beings, we have all the choice, but we limit ourselves by believing in the doorkeeper in our minds.

I find this to be interesting, anyone else?

Blame the Man at the Gate!

In continuing the trend of discussing Kafka's Before the Law, and as a sort of response to Matt's post, I want to look at why the man should have resisted the doorkeeper's supposed authority. While I completely understand Matt's concern with the hypocrisy of condemning the man when we ourselves would submit just as quickly, I think that that only extends so far. The man in the story spent his entire life waiting to be allowed through the gate; I highly doubt that anyone in his right mind would wait forever for something without action. Additionally, the man's goal was not a negligible one, such as wanting to walk through grounds with a No Trespassing sign, it was along the lines of his life's goal. He gave up everything he had to the doorkeeper in hopes of bribing him. The doorkeeper repeatedly tells the man that he is "only taking it to keep [him] from thinking [he has] omitted anything" (172). This implies that there is nothing the man can give that will earn him passage. If this is the case, what hope should he have that he'll ever make it through? What baffles me even more is that the doorkeeper also told the man that it was possible for him to get around the doorkeeper without permission, difficult though it may be. I like to think that if I were barred from reaching my life's goal by an obstacle as interminable and yet surmountable as the doorkeeper, I would wait no longer than a few days before trying my luck.

Sartre's concept of the adversarial coefficient only adds to this. If everything outside of oneself is a facticity and is not inherently helpful or harmful to one's agenda, then personal perception is the only factor impeding progress. In this case, the doorkeeper's power is given to him by the man because of his perception of the doorkeeper's presence as strong and intimidating. If the man were able to overcome this self-imposed submission, the doorkeeper would lose all so-called authority. However, the man continues to handicap himself and any progress toward his goal of reaching the Law.

The Doorkeeper as Conscience

We started our discussion of Kafka’s Before the Law by talking about the ambiguity in his use of the word before. I was one of the few who thought Kafka meant before in the temporal sense.

Because I interpreted ‘before’ temporally, I took ‘before the law’ to mean the man’s conscience.  This fits in with the idea Zach brought up in class. He raised the very interesting idea that the traveler and the doorkeeper are one and the same.  If we take the doorman to be the man’s conscience, we can perhaps understand why he is so unwilling to pass through the door without the doorkeeper’s permission. To arrive at Law, one would have to pass by one’s own conscience. It is a difficult thing, as a human, to completely turn your back on your own conscience. This interpretation could explain why the gate would only be made specifically for the man. Each man must interpret Law in terms of his own conscience; that is inescapable. However, if the doorkeeper truly is the man’s conscience, why would his conscience stand in the way of the Law?

Well, Law in the story is always written with a capital l, implying that it is the product of a higher force and, because of that, it is immutable. To find the Law would mean to have a very definite code of how one should live, a code defined by someone of than oneself. Perhaps defined by a deity or maybe as a compilation of each individual’s own personal law. As Kafka says, “the Law, [the man] thinks, should be accessible at all times and to everyone…” Maybe to find the Law would mean to give up one’s freedom as individual and that, as individuals, we cannot help but to frame universal law within our own moral standards.  In fact, as the man waits at the door, he never comes any closer to the Law, but has many conversations with the doorkeeper. The man is getting to know his conscience better and better, making it harder to remove himself from his conscience. In his moment of death the door to the Law is shut by the doorkeeper. This could be an expression of how each individual must die as just that, an individual – entirely alone with only one’s conscience, not a universal set of morals.

I really hope this made sense and didn’t seem too far-fetched. Let me know what you think.

Don't Blame the Man at the Gate

In Kafka's Before The Law, we encounter the man at the gate. He waits his entire life for admittance to the Law, or whatever it is behind the gate that the gatekeeper is guarding. He blindly accepts the gatekeeper's authority that hadn't been established nor given any merit. He eventually passes in front of the gate and the gatekeeper tells him it was only his gate to pass through, and was made for him.

Initially we were quick to jump the man and blame him for not questioning the authority. I think this is wrong of us to do for certain reasons. First and foremost, we must assume that the man came from a society where there was already a power hierarchy and he was just a country man, who has not been concerned with questioning power. It is simply human nature, in a slavish morale you could say, to not question the present authority, even when it is stopping you from accessing something that is yours, such as the law and this man's gate. Also, i think it is foolish for us to blame the man for not entering the gate without permission. If we are put in his situation, or something similar, and told not to enter, we do not enter, especially if a guard is present. We act even more sheepish than him and don't ask questions when there is something as simple as a "No Trespassing" sign on a gate. That's all it takes for us to not enter a gate. We are at fault for blaming the man for not trying to enter the gate with the presence of the guard, when it takes much less for us to not even question the authority or legitimacy of an opposing force.

I think we should be asking the question, not why the man didn’t try to enter against the guard, but rather what exactly is the guard doing there and why? Is he a figment of the country man’s imagination, or was he placed there by a greater force that is there to guard the law? But if that’s the case, then why doe he not let the man through or admit him to the law since the gate to the law is made solely for the man? Or is the man wrong about the Law by thinking it is beyond the gate, when rather the Law is simply the guard standing there, and by submitting himself to the guard is giving the Law its legitimacy?

Choosing Oneself

The following examples of choosing oneself are purposefully controversial and thus bring up strong feelings often.


A person is asked if they could change one thing about his or herself in which this change would give him or her a qualitatively better life. For instance, this person could have the choice to relive life as a heterosexual rather than face the traumas of homophobia, or a black person might be given the choice to live as a white child, thus benefiting from inequality rather than suffering from it.

Many people argue that by changing themselves like that they would lose some essential part of themselves. In other words, they choose homosexuality, blackness, or any other identity for themselves. The quality is no longer an accident and changing it is linked to self-denial or destruction. To choose to change is to choose not to be.

Why do people choose some qualities as essential while others as not. For instance, transgenders deal with two kinds of essentialism. One is the essentialism that says the body determines gender and changing that is denial of the body. This essentialism is associated with the cisnormative society. The other is that psychology is essential to gender and denying that is denying self. This essentialism is associated with the transnormative progressive position.

Jean-Paul Sartre would argues that the self has no essence. This means that neither cisnormative and transnormative narratives are right. This leaves us with the question of what a person should do under any circumstance where they can change something about themselves. Ought a black person choose blackness or whiteness? (Not choosing is the same as choosing blackness)

Jean-Paul Sartre argues that we choose for everyone. Does that mean that what the black person chooses all should choose? Does that mean everyone ought to be white or stay the complexion they currently are? Does the transsexual reassign the sex of everyone? Does the homosexual have sex with men for all men and women?

This seems absurd to me, so perhaps I misinterpret Jean-Paul Sartre's moral theory.Perhaps choosing the self is only for the self and not the business (or responsibility) of the world. This would mean that choosing blackness is an equal choice to choosing whiteness.

Freedom as a Limitation of Freedom

I found our discussion about Sartre's definition of freedom to be a little troubling. In an attempt to understand this definition, we ended up separating Sartre's definition from what has become the modern notion of freedom. That is, we differentiated the concept of freedom as the mere ability to imagine any project we may conceive from the more contemporary notion of freedom as the fulfillment and fruition of our will. Sartre does this, I believe, in an attempt to expand the boundaries of our freedom, which he does through his ideas concerning the "brute fact" of an object vs. our imposition of adversity: if objects simply exist objectively, and it is merely our our personal decision on a subjective project that in turn defines the object as an imposition or not, then essentially there exists no objectively existing impediments or limitations. I am inclined to agree with our ability and propensity to define objects as they are related to the project in which they are involved. However, I believe this concept of freedom, as it posits the extending existence of an object solely in the mind, actually limits our human freedom; freedom becomes restricted to the imagination alone, and is not able to be expressed through physical attempts, because then we would set up objects as impediments by our decision to act on an individual project. But in our attempt to not create these impediments, we are limited not only in what we can achieve but also in what we can conceive: in order to not create an impediment as they are defined in our mind, we cannot conceive of projects that cannot be fulfilled; if we exercise our "freedom" in this way, we necessarily create these impediments, which Sartre claims is the real barrier to our freedom. However, these limitations arise out of the very exercise of our freedom. In this circular manner, it would appear that the creation of impediments is inescapable and not an expression of freedom at all. In this way, Sartre's definition of freedom actually becomes itself an impediment to freedom. What does this inescapable quality of freedom do to our conception of human existence as the essence of our freedom? Are we actually free to define ourselves and our situation in the way that we would choose? This question has huge implication on the idea of bad faith: is bad faith in fact possible given that freedom does not seem wholly capable of transcendence? Or does this concept actually strengthen the concept of bad faith, by defining the manner in which bad faith is an improper use of our ability to transcend the situation; in fact, the we do not maintain the ability to transcend at all...

Response-able we are; Do something with it

The last few classes and in last week’s posts, people have been debating whether Sartre’s radical declaration of responsibility would be beneficial if everyone followed such an idea.

In class, we broke down Sartre’s idea of responsibility into the understanding that everyone is response-able, which means everyone can respond any given situation. When discussing the consequences from everyone bearing the responsibility, it seems that many people were not convinced that a better world would result.

For example, Ben and Allison mentioned that the bystander effect is a problem in this idea of responsibility because people would “pass off” taking responsibility for a situation because there are other people involved. In other words, the incentive to take action would decrease because there are other people that bear the same responsibility as you.

I understand the problem of the bystander effect but I disagree. I think that if there was a universal understanding and following of Sartre’s responsibility, then the world would be better.

If everyone is able to respond to any situation, wouldn’t that simple idea serve as an incentive for someone to respond to a situation in a positive, beneficial manner? For example, in class we discussed how everyone in class is aware of the war in Iraq. Because we are aware of the war, we must respond to the situation of the war. Personally, I would like the war to stop because my Uncle is over in Iraq; however, I am not advocating for the war to stop through any of my actions. I am not actively trying to stop the war, which means that I am responding in a way that advocates for the war to continue.

Doesn't an idea of advocating for a war because of lack of participation serve as an incentive to take action? I think so. To think locally, or at least nationally, we have issues of poverty and homelessness (with humans and animals). If we are not trying to combat these problems, whether through volunteering at soup kitchens, protesting, etc., then we are saying that we are okay with such problems.

If everyone realized that our response to a situation/problem/etc. impacts the world as a whole and not just us individually, then I think that our society would have less hostility. I do not think that all or our problems would disappear, but I do think that we would be on the way to finding solutions and enacting laws to help combat worldwide problems.

What do you think? Do you agree that Sartre’s idea of responsibility would lead to a better world? Or do you disagree?

Simply a Matter of Perspective?

I found Sartre's discussion of the coefficient of adversity in his essay Freedom and Facticity: The Situation to be rather fascinating. He states that it is through humankind's freedom to choose its own goals and aspirations that otherwise neutral objects develop either helpful or harmful qualities. The example of the crag was presented, which to a climber becomes an obstacle but to an artist becomes a spectacle. To the climber, it is either scalable or unscalable. To the artist, it is either beautiful or ugly. The notion reminds me of the manner in which I considered the Existentialism movement prior to taking this course. I thought, at a basic level, that Existentialism involves humans assigning meaning to their own surroundings, their own lives, and their own existence.

Sartre's claim is certainly a bold one. It suggests that any situation that an individual is in can be viewed as positive or negative depending on the coefficient that is assigned to it. And the coefficient is determined by the goal that the individual has chosen for him/herself. Consider a wreck on the interstate that creates miles upon miles of standstill traffic. To an individual whose goal is to arrive at work on time, the traffic situation is an obstacle and is thus assigned a coefficient of adversity. To an individual whose goal is to postpone his/her arrival for as long as possible, the situation is beneficial and thus assigned a more positive coefficient.

This leads me to believe that any situation I ever find myself in can be switched from harmful to helpful, or vis versa, simply by an alteration of my perspective. Poor grades are only a bad thing if my goal is to receive good ones. So that raises a question. Is it really just a matter of one's perspective? Can any situation be altered by simply changing the coefficient of adversity?

It seems to me that it might be a little more complicated than a quick alteration of one's outlook. In the case of physical pain or abuse, most people would agree that it is not beneficial or enjoyable (there are a few strange exceptions, but I won't spend any time addressing those). And I cannot seem to find a perspective that would justify the abuse having anything other than a negative coefficient. Or perhaps the abuse itself cannot be considered a neutral object because it stems from human emotion? Perhaps I'm missing the point. Any comments or corrections would be greatly appreciated.

Feminist Existentialism

I was thinking about Sartre's view on how identity and values are only defined through our consciousness which then allows us to determine our individual meaning to life. While doing some research I ran across a statement by Sartre's contemporary Simone de Beauvoir, "One is not born a woman, but becomes one" and I wondered how existentialism played a part in the feminism.

In Beauvoir's book, The Second Sex she focuses on a woman's sexuality and on existentialism. Her main argument is the role of men and how since they have always had the upper hand in society, woman have always been shaped by them. She also focuses on "The Other" stating that from the start women are always considered the other because of the way the social latter works out with men holding the top spot. She also argues that historically woman have always had this idea that men are the model on which they shape themselves. And this attitude holds women back from being able to change the conception of what is normal.

Here is where existentialism comes into play. Beauvoir also argued that women are just as capable of choice as men. She says women must move beyond from being beings in themselves to a transcended position becoming beings for themselves and taking responsibility for their world and choosing freedom.

http://www.ruzovyamodrysvet.sk/chillout5_items/4/1/2/412_92f5e9.pdf
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/de-beauvoir/2nd-sex/introduction.htm

We Are Response-able

Connecting our discussion of Sartre's responsibility and current events. One thing comes to mind: "Occupy" Wall Street Movement. I am not making a declaration of my views, but only trying to see how this relates to our discussions in class.

Even if you do not have the slightest ideas about this movement, you more than likely have heard about it. While the movement started on Wall Street, it has vastly expanded to other areas of the country. Surprisingly, it has even been picked up around the world.

What is so important about this movement is that it is a response to how the our society is operating. It is a push for social and economic change. Even though (I think) that Sartre would proudly support this movement, is it good for our country?

Lately, I have been watching the news, trying to pick up on what this movement was really about. But I have not been able to pinpoint what exactly it is demanding of the government and of corporations. Either way, I realize that it is just a response to the social and economic strains of society. People want change. The numbers frequently pops up on the television screen: 99% and 1%. This division within our society is relevant. But does the movement further divide us? These numbers are absolutely polar opposites. I feel as if this is the reaction that Sartre wanted. Are Sartre's radical ideas harm us or do us good? He wants people to respond to "injustice" even if it only at a subjective perspective. Apparently, also, many people feel this way. Sartre's ideas on responsibility, to me, are a call-to-action. And this is a prime example of that, currently.

If people felt that the corporations and government are unjust, then they are responsible for it. To say that there is nothing that people can do about this injustice is to say that they are not free; it is to say that they are mere objects and are completely subservient to his/her facticity. By responding to their beliefs, they are promoting their transcendence.

Please feel free to tell me what you think. Correct this, add to it, respond to it. I really want feedback and I am looking for other ways to connect Sartre to current affairs. I think that this would be a good way for me and others to put Sartre's ideas into perspective. I think that the "occupy" movement is a great place to start because it is really growing. I am not looking for opinions about the movement though, just the connection.

Democratic peace

Since the unipolar movement of the United states post cold war the American ideal has been spreading. Capitalism, democracy, globalization in general, have all been aspects of this post cold war era. The years prior to 2008 were known as the age of optimism were technology was held in strong standing and the global economy was intertwined with the united states. Some could say technology has been the answer to a lot of social differences and a strong indicator of the spread of democracy. Libya, Syria, Egypt, Kenya (with the signing of their constitution) and many countries have been effected by the democractic idea. Is this democractic peace theory true? Is technology the answer to all conflicts; medicine, political, and environmental.

Facebook, google, and technology as a whole has been used to describe children of our generation (this maybe untrue for seniors in our class!). This programs have arguably helped to spread democracy, but it has created civil unrest.

My question is technology the ultimate bandaid, or does it cause just as many problems as it solves? Is this idea of a democratic peace true? I no that this isn't philosophy but I'm interested to see what many of you think of present day ideas. Thank you!

Sartre's Two Worlds

Within his essay “Freedom and Facticity: The Situation”, Sartre establishes that reality – as far as the “being-for-itself” is concerned – is not based in absolute facticity, or “brute” things. Instead the reality of a conscious being is shaped in part by its freedom. This is well within the liking of Sartre’s previously established principle that the conscious being is absolutely free. Following this path of logic, it is then established that an individual’s freedom interacts with its perceptions of its environment, and beyond into the whole extent of its reality. (However, freedom does not negate “brute existents” – the facticity of things. It can only go so far as to have them go unnoticed by the individual.)

Using this understanding, Sartre implies there is a reality contained of only “brute existents,” as well as the reality perceived by each “being-for-itself” which is manipulated almost entirely by that being’s freedom. These two existences are inseparable, as they exist in the same time and space. They cannot negate one another – just as an individual cannot transcended its facticity absolutely and its transcendence can never be absolutely denied by the same facticity; a person’s freedom is not absolute, but a person is always free.

Therefore are therefore intrinsic and compose what can be described as human experience in which freedom is the defining component. Even to feel this notion is to acknowledge that it is part of your existence following the logic of Sartre, for it is through freedom that you can attempt to flee it in anyway. Freedom, therefore, not only provides an understanding of reality for the conscious being, but influences its entire perception of brute things. This, in turn, allows an individual’s freedom to ascribe meaning to the facticity of its existence.

All these components create what is known as “the situation.” It is within “the situation” that is becomes impossible to discern the influence of freedom on the “brute existents” of reality.

At this point, I wish to interject my own consideration on this mediation of what is essentially the human experience. If our realities are defined in part by our freedom and the actual facticity of existence, how is “the situation” every truly escapable? Is there every a time in which a person can absolutely understand, without a doubt, the line between the components of their reality drawn from their freedom, and those parts which are unable to be changed – no matter how they are attempted to be perceived?

I would very much appreciate any opinion. I might just not be getting it and would be happy to hear it made more clear. Thank you.

Sartre, responsibility, and normativity

Sartre has a radical understanding of responsibility. He seeks to distance the idea of responsibility from juridical notions of blameworthiness and fault. While I didn't understand this on Tuesday, I think that our discussion on Thursday helped clear some things up. By being responsible Sartre means response-able, the ability to respond. I agree with Sartre insofar as we are always able to respond to our situation and the factiticy of being in the world.

Sartre goes on to argue that this notion of radical responsibility leads to a better worldview. I agree with him that people today don’t see themselves in as radically free and responsible. We tend to understand our responsibilities as being those things that we have a direct control over. I agree with Sartre that we are, in a sense, responsible even for those things that we cannot directly control. We cannot simply stand by and be uninvolved. Our stance of ‘uninvolvement’ is a choice that we must take responsibility for. We often short change ourselves about the difference we are capable of making in the world.

Where I’d like to challenge Sartre is on his assertion that the world would be a better place if we all understood and took to heart our radical responsibility for everything in our world. I agree that if each individual took more responsibility for his or her life, he or she would better interact with his or her world. However, if each individual knew that each other individual was also radically responsible for the events around him or her, I think that there would be much less of an incentive to act. Everyone fully understanding his or her responsibility would create a bystander effect. For example, if I understand myself as responsible for the poverty in Memphis, I would probably be more likely to do something. However, if I also believed that every other Memphian was equally responsible for that poverty, I would be much less inclined to do anything about it. I would count on everyone to do the work and only concern myself with what I wanted to do. Since I’m equally responsible for everything else I see around me, there might be other problems I find more important. Because I cannot rank these responsibilities (because I am equally responsible for all of them) I have no justification to choose one over the other.

Ultimately what I think this comes down to is that by saying that everyone is radically responsible for everything equally, the notion of responsibility loses any notion of normativity. Can Sartre reclaim normativity, or does existentialism, by rejecting all moral principles, preclude the notion of normativity all together?

Freedom's Limitations

We encounter a difficulty when Sartre contentiously claims that the only limitations on freedom are self-imposed. Does this not just seem totally out of line? How can there not be a situation in which my freedom is inhibited by some physical circumstance I am in? Surely I cannot scale the crag because the crag itself is limiting me to, right? I want to reexamine this issue and maybe open the door to shed some light on how Sartre's claim can be so.

Sartre's freedom is a radical freedom. There is never a situation where you cannot exercise freedom -- that is what it means to be absolutely free (and it certainly does not mean that one can do anything). Freedom is closely tied to its neighbor concept, responsibility. To be responsible for something is not limited to being able to be blamed for it, but to bear any sort of relation to it at all, no matter how insignificant. Responsibility in this sense has a sort of regard for the present and future, as opposed to the concerns of past blames in the juridical sense. Everything that somebody does, it is done freely, and that person is responsible for anything that s/he can affect in some way. But is Sartre right to extend this idea so far to the point that freedom is only limited by itself?

I argue that making this point tenable is really a question of semantics. I feel quite comfortable saying that the prisoner has restricted freedom under his circumstances. Sartre argues that he is still as free as he ever was even before imprisonment. Surely this implies that there is an important distinction between the familiar notion of freedom and freedom as Sartre puts it, but the difference is hard to pinpoint. Whereas I see the prisoner as having freedom limited because his possible actions are fewer under the circumstances than they would be otherwise, Sartre seems to argue that his freedom is only limited because the prisoner is choosing to engage in a situation that would limit his freedom. Thus, freedom is what is really limiting freedom. Remember that Sartre says that freedom is a project, an activity: it manifests itself when we engage ourselves in some project. But there is still the choice whether or not to engage in the project which may limit our freedom, which is itself a free choice. It's an interesting perspective, but I am having difficulty giving a definitive answer to what the difference is between our familiar notions of freedom and Sartre's freedom. It seems to have something to do with Sartre's freedom always having the ability to choose its battles, so that it would be the cause of its own limitation. I invite anyone who has insight on this problem to comment.

The Hope of Universal Responsibility

"...what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God. In this sense existentialism is optimistic, it is a doctrine of action, and it is only by self-deception, by confusing their own despair with ours that Christians can describe us as without hope." (Sartre 214)

When we discussed the assignation of responsibility for the world to all individuals, I was quite struck by the impact it would have. In comparison with the contemporary world it seems to be the polar opposite. To make a sweeping generalization, most people do not even take responsibility for all of their own actions, much less the goings-on of the world around them.

A good example of this is the problem of the bystander effect: when an individual is in an emergency situation, a bystander will not help if there are others present. The probability of one helping the victim decreases as the number of bystanders increases. This makes evident just how unwilling individuals are to accept responsibility for the world around them, even when it means ignoring someone in need of immediate help. Instead, they wordlessly shirk the responsibility onto everyone else, or worse, believe that no one is obligated to help the victim.

When people refuse to take responsibility for the world's problems, there is no way to reach a resolution. Everyone will just continue to suffer, always waiting for the next man in line to stand up and finally do something. However, because this mentality has unfortunately become so pervasive, such an act is unlikely. And I understand, to an extent: as we discussed, recognizing that you are personally responsible for the world that you live in and everything that comprises it is entirely overwhelming, almost unfathomable. To know that inaction toward any malignancy is equivalent to acceptance feels like an insurmountable weight for any one person to carry.

However, I wholly agree with the above quotation by Sartre: this need not be seen as a depressing, overwhelming concept. Allotting everyone with responsibility for their world would assuredly force them to recognize the extent of their freedom as human beings, and their prospective effect on what goes on in the world around them. It is difficult for me to imagine that the masses would then be able to ignore atrocities, as they would feel personal responsibility for the consequences. So instead of being described as hopeless, it is in fact an extremely hopeful idea.

So many questions about Sartre

Jean-Paul Sartre is quoted as saying “Our responsibility is much greater than we might have supposed, because it involves all mankind.” Sartre’s sense of responsibility rests upon his views on freedom, in that everyone is absolutely free and the only restrictions we place on our freedoms are projections of actions upon it, such as the example of the insurmountable cliff. My objection with Sartre lies in the simple idea that we are responsible for all of mankind and its actions. As an individual, I find it hard to conceptualize that I can be responsible for an occurring across the globe, simply on the premise that I am human being with free will on earth. In other instances, such as disapproving of the government’s action as I had a choice in voting and partaking in its form and function, I can see the point. I just simply find it hard to believe that one can be held responsible for acts he has no clue about or any idea that they could even happen.

Sartre claims that man’s “existence comes before essence.” In this sense, if it is up to man to define himself, it is not possible for him to choose his own essence in an accord that is against free will? Or would this simple be a projection of his free will to try to act against his free will that is stopping him from being free? Sartre claims that by choosing one’s own essence, which he is making this essence upon others “a certain image of a man he would have him to be.” If everyone chooses a different essence, how can one be held responsible for the essences of others, if they are completely different and unrelated and cause one to act in a contradictory way?

Also, if man is always changing as well as the way he defines himself, is it possible to place responsibility of all the world on one’s view that is always in flux or place it on a view he could have held in the past but no longer holds? Also, if man is always put in situations where he has to choose, how can he be held responsible for his actions if the only choices are those in which negative consequences will come, and must all humankind then be responsible for this unavoidable problem?

Sorry about all the questions, but reading Sartre and discussing this in class raised more questions for me than it answered.

Humans are not Free

It is important to note that I am proposing a very radical understanding of our freedom, which is not that of Jean-Paul Sartre.

Sartre understands freedom as the ability of the Being-for-itself to actualize its own possibilities. I on the other hand see freedom of an individual to act as an independent will. For Sartre, it is impossible for humans to be under the control of another will. I come to the conclusion that humans are not free but studying the facticity of humans, something we cannot transcend.

Let us look at the human. The human is a social animal who from a young age learns language. This language is shared by many humans and is not limited to words but also expressions of emotions. For example, people learn the appropriate situations and expressions for their emotions. When a person acts outside social norms, it is not uncommon to imagine what others think. A person is so socialize that they think in the language of society. How can you be free if your very thinking is determined by social construction?

How can you say that you chose this or that emotion if either natural or social circumstances cause you to act that way? Well, one chooses to follow social norms because one could always not behave against them. If it is possible to act outside social norms, why is it sometimes difficult, why can we not escape our social thinking, our they-thoughts? It is because we can think only with simultaneous They-thoughts and I-thoughts. While we our existentially aware of ourselves, we are simultaneously aware of the They, and furthermore our consciousness is filled with the They.

While I admit that a human will have I-thoughts, there is always a They-thought that underlies it. We must understand ourselves in terms given to us by the They, and because of that, we must act within a They-dominated mind. If we are to rebel, we must act as They understand rebelling.

Since I am determinist, I will define freedom compatibly as acting as oneself for oneself beyond the control of others. This definition is not useless even though humans are not free because of their social dependence. This freedom applies to non-social animals for whom acting independently is in their nature. These non-social animals are the true Beings-for-themselves.

Transcendence and Emotional States

So far we have only really discussed Sartre’s concept of bad faith. In simple terms, bad faith is a lie to oneself; this is different than lying to someone else because lying to oneself requires one to know the whole truth if such truth is supposed to be concealed through a lie. In addition, there are two modes of being: a being-in-itself and a being-for-itself. A being-in-itself is a being that is not free -- an object -- and is constituted by its facticity (the facts of its existence). A being-for-itself is a being that is free -- a human -- and is constituted by both its facticity and transcendence.

A being-for-itself is capable of being in bad faith while a being-in-itself is not. Being in bad faith can happen in two different situations: a being-for-itself can lie in such a way to deny its facticity or it can lie to deny its transcendence. We went through examples in class of both situations.

The third example we discussed regarded how bad faith occurs when someone says “I am sad.” Sartre argues that when someone claims that he is sad, that person is in bad faith. He is in bad faith because if one makes himself sad, he will have to continually make himself sad. In other words, the person is not sad in the mode of a being-in-itself, which means the person is denying his transcendence.

This example started a small discussion in class about disagreeing with Sartre. People in class were arguing that one can’t concern itself with emotions in terms of just transcendence; rather, it is a combination of facticity and transcendence. I disagree with them, and therefore agree with Sartre. I think it makes sense that someone is in bad faith if he is claiming that he IS sad over a continuous period of time. Sartre makes a good point that when another person enters a room containing someone who is sad, the person who is sad will “promise [sadness] an appointment for later after the departure of the visitor” (231). Everyone has probably been in such a situation at least once.

I remember reading something (I don’t remember where) that said that an emotional state only lasts for a very short period of time (something less than 5 minutes). If this is true then Sartre’s argument is true. You must be telling yourself you are in a certain state -- i.e. being sad, happy, angry, etc. For some substantial proof, I found information regarding the self-control over emotions. This article/journal/study states that there are intrinsic and extrinsic factors that help develop self-control over emotions and such self-control begins developing during the first years of life.

What do you think? Is such evidence proof that Sartre is correct? Do you think that facticity still plays a role, despite the proof of the ability to control emotions?



www.education.umd.edu/EDHD/faculty/Fox/publications/31.pdf

An Inkwell is an Inkwell

As I understand it, Sartre's “bad faith” refers to a human being denying his or her ability to transcend the givens of a particular situation – that is, pretending as if it is feasible to make no decision at all when presented with a choice. A paradox arises, which was stated in class several times: if one chooses to not choose, they've still made a choice. Otherwise we as humans would be equal to a desk or a chair or, as Sartre would prefer, an inkwell.

In class, we also discussed that a man working as a waiter is not a waiter in the same way that an inkwell is an inkwell. The discussion made me wonder, are human beings anything in the same way that an inkwell is an inkwell? I'm not even sure if one could say that humans are human in the same way that an inkwell is an inkwell, since the meaning and purpose of human existence is somewhat more complicated than that of the inkwell. Nor could I say that I am myself in the same way that an inkwell is an inkwell because the notion of “myself” is fairly indeterminate.

In Sartre's example of the waiter, the occupation of a human is examined. In his example of the woman on a date, the circumstances and reactions of a human are examined. In his example of the homosexual, a characteristic of a human is examined. None of the examples investigate the individuals themselves and whether or not they are wholly them. Introspection and the concept of one's self are also mentioned by Sartre during his evaluation of sincerity, but does he mention whether or not a human can ever be anything as wholly and purely as an inkwell is an inkwell? He very well may have, and I could have completely missed it.

I know all humans demonstrate bad faith at one point or another when they deny their own freedom, refusing to transcend givens. The woman on the date attempts to ignore the implications of her suitor by separating her human consciousness from her physical body. The waiter is simply playing the role of a waiter, turning himself into an object. But again, those are only circumstances and occupations. I am just curious as to whether or not there's a category humans can wholly fit into or if, as a condition of our complicated existence, we never attain the inkwell-is-an-inkwell simplicity.

What Happens After...

In our last couple classes we discussed Sartre's idea of Bad Faith. We defined it in simple terms as "a lie to ones self". Along with the two modes of being: a being for itself and a being in itself. And we explored a number of examples of people who choose to act upon or not act upon their freedom to transcend.

Alot of times in life we go through certain actions because we feel like we are obligated to do them as opposed to wanting to do them(i.e our roles as students, we are told that we must attend school so we feel obligated to take on that role) as could be the case of Sartre's example of the waiter. I realized that bad faith is a principle that humans act upon throughout our lives. There are always certain places or certain situations which we would rather not be apart of but we allow ourselves to stay in that situation anyway and learn to "play the role". But since we are beings for ourselves we have the ability to Transcend.

But what happens after the act of transcendence? Does the individual just chill cause it happened or do you have to work at maintaining it? And is there ever a point where you fall back into bad faith and have to do the transcendence process all over again?

Why Does It Really Matter?

In class, we discussed the concept of bad faith, and found that no one can escape bad faith. Well if that is the case, why does it really matter?

So we understand that there are two types of being: a being in itself and a being for itself. A being in itself is comprised of facts (facticity). It is also a being that is circumstantial. It has no choices and is a product of the world and the circumstances that it is thrown into. A being in itself is objective. For instance, a table, a chair, or a plant. They are all products of circumstance. They have no free will to choose what it is. They cannot transcend their beings and make their own choices.

A being for itself on the other hand, is a being that is free. Even though it is in part facticity, more importantly it is transcendent. Unlike objects, a being for itself has choices. It can knowingly make react to circumstance even if it is limited to it. Human beings are a being for itself. Whether or not one knowingly denies it, it is a reality. A being for itself cannot just brush off hard decisions, but they can still in their mind deny responsibility for that decision. This is an instance of bad faith. Bad faith is when a person denies its transcendent state and acts merely as a object (a lie).

To me, so far so good.

So then the topic of sincerity arises, and from what I understand is the exact opposite of being in bad faith. But Sartre says that even a person that is sincere is just acting or playing at being sincere. Even the sincere person is also living in bad faith. So technically, everybody is living in bad faith.

This is where I begin to lose sight of what he is trying to say. Even though I assume that he does not mean that living in bad faith is bad, what is the point of it all? I know that there is something more to it, and so far I lack the understanding of his motives behind this. I still cannot help to feel somewhat disappointed. I feel disappointed not because we are all living in bad faith, but the fact that I just do not see how understanding this can make me a better person.

I know that we are not done talking about Sartre yet, but this is how I feel so far. Tell me what you think.

Freedom

Sartre's theory on a being for themselves and a being in themselves is very intriguing; having freedom is a property of life. The ability to be free can transcend the facts if a given situation, and only beings for themselves can do this. Is what Sartre points out what it means to be human? At the start of the school year we discussed what it meant for a person to be human. The idea of emotions, intellect, the fear of death, etc, all came up, but Sartre is suggesting that you cannot be human without freedom. I tried to find a counter to this and came up with the example of a person he runs wild and is naiive in the ways of civilization; the counter back was it was that persons choice to live like that, they are still expressing freedom. Humans can flee freedom but this results in their freedom to choose what they want to do. A person always has a choice even if it is a poor result for given situation. If I were held up at a Mcdonalds and told to murder a person inside and bring a big-mac out, or be shot myself, I still have the choice of doing one or the other.

Can someone be human without freedom of choice? I no Sartre never flat out says that but this is how I interpret parts of his theory's. If I've totally misinterpreted this sorry!

The They

I really think that this understanding of the they as a form of denial of responsibility and lack of authenticity is truly ingenious. It seems so strange how we always use this phrase without even thinking of the consequences. We are referring to everyone and no one, which to me is a bit mind-boggeling, but then the question for me is, is this a bad thing? Especially seeing as it is essential to our Being? We lose responsibility, yes, but doesn't it create a form of mass- responsibility at least for our calculative thinking to be correct? To me, a lot of meditative thinking results in quack facts. There are a ton of people who don't refer to the they or think of the they as the man and what not, and we dismiss them as conspiracy theorists and what not. For the most part, I believe us, or the they ( to them) to be correct about them, they are indeed nut jobs. However, how can we know?