Friday, October 14, 2011

Freedom's Limitations

We encounter a difficulty when Sartre contentiously claims that the only limitations on freedom are self-imposed. Does this not just seem totally out of line? How can there not be a situation in which my freedom is inhibited by some physical circumstance I am in? Surely I cannot scale the crag because the crag itself is limiting me to, right? I want to reexamine this issue and maybe open the door to shed some light on how Sartre's claim can be so.

Sartre's freedom is a radical freedom. There is never a situation where you cannot exercise freedom -- that is what it means to be absolutely free (and it certainly does not mean that one can do anything). Freedom is closely tied to its neighbor concept, responsibility. To be responsible for something is not limited to being able to be blamed for it, but to bear any sort of relation to it at all, no matter how insignificant. Responsibility in this sense has a sort of regard for the present and future, as opposed to the concerns of past blames in the juridical sense. Everything that somebody does, it is done freely, and that person is responsible for anything that s/he can affect in some way. But is Sartre right to extend this idea so far to the point that freedom is only limited by itself?

I argue that making this point tenable is really a question of semantics. I feel quite comfortable saying that the prisoner has restricted freedom under his circumstances. Sartre argues that he is still as free as he ever was even before imprisonment. Surely this implies that there is an important distinction between the familiar notion of freedom and freedom as Sartre puts it, but the difference is hard to pinpoint. Whereas I see the prisoner as having freedom limited because his possible actions are fewer under the circumstances than they would be otherwise, Sartre seems to argue that his freedom is only limited because the prisoner is choosing to engage in a situation that would limit his freedom. Thus, freedom is what is really limiting freedom. Remember that Sartre says that freedom is a project, an activity: it manifests itself when we engage ourselves in some project. But there is still the choice whether or not to engage in the project which may limit our freedom, which is itself a free choice. It's an interesting perspective, but I am having difficulty giving a definitive answer to what the difference is between our familiar notions of freedom and Sartre's freedom. It seems to have something to do with Sartre's freedom always having the ability to choose its battles, so that it would be the cause of its own limitation. I invite anyone who has insight on this problem to comment.

3 comments:

  1. I think Sartre is right to extend the ideas of freedom and responsibility to the point that freedom is only limited by itself. In the example of a prisoner, I understand both points of view, but I agree with Sartre that the prisoner's freedom is only limitied because he chooses to engage in the situation that limitis such freedom. The prisoner can still choose to do whatever he wants. I think to make this point that Sartre is trying to make, we must remember that we are able to exercise our freedom in any situation, but such action may lead to unfavorable circumstances. Hence, the prisoner could climb the fence and escape if he so desired, but he would have to face the consequences.
    I hope that clears up your confusion.

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  2. I think we touched on this subject in our last class when we differentiated the concepts of freedom: Sartre's definition of freedom as the ability to choose to act, and the modern definition as the fulfillment of that decision. I still have hesitations in regards to this distinction. If there exists certain "bare" qualities about an object that would limit my ability to see the fruition of my will, this in turn seems to limit the freedom of what I choose the think about, for why would one bother with what cannot fulfilled? However, based solely on Sartre's distinction, it is purely our ability to think that makes our freedom boundless.

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  3. I don't think that Sartre would say that a prisoner is not limited in some kind of meaningful way. However, the radical nature of her freedom is not limited because she is still responsible (able to respond) to choose a course of action. If she decided that she actually wanted to be a prisoner, then her chains would be a useful tool for achieving her goals instead of a obstacle to be overcome.

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