So far we have only really discussed Sartre’s concept of bad faith. In simple terms, bad faith is a lie to oneself; this is different than lying to someone else because lying to oneself requires one to know the whole truth if such truth is supposed to be concealed through a lie. In addition, there are two modes of being: a being-in-itself and a being-for-itself. A being-in-itself is a being that is not free -- an object -- and is constituted by its facticity (the facts of its existence). A being-for-itself is a being that is free -- a human -- and is constituted by both its facticity and transcendence.
A being-for-itself is capable of being in bad faith while a being-in-itself is not. Being in bad faith can happen in two different situations: a being-for-itself can lie in such a way to deny its facticity or it can lie to deny its transcendence. We went through examples in class of both situations.
The third example we discussed regarded how bad faith occurs when someone says “I am sad.” Sartre argues that when someone claims that he is sad, that person is in bad faith. He is in bad faith because if one makes himself sad, he will have to continually make himself sad. In other words, the person is not sad in the mode of a being-in-itself, which means the person is denying his transcendence.
This example started a small discussion in class about disagreeing with Sartre. People in class were arguing that one can’t concern itself with emotions in terms of just transcendence; rather, it is a combination of facticity and transcendence. I disagree with them, and therefore agree with Sartre. I think it makes sense that someone is in bad faith if he is claiming that he IS sad over a continuous period of time. Sartre makes a good point that when another person enters a room containing someone who is sad, the person who is sad will “promise [sadness] an appointment for later after the departure of the visitor” (231). Everyone has probably been in such a situation at least once.
I remember reading something (I don’t remember where) that said that an emotional state only lasts for a very short period of time (something less than 5 minutes). If this is true then Sartre’s argument is true. You must be telling yourself you are in a certain state -- i.e. being sad, happy, angry, etc. For some substantial proof, I found information regarding the self-control over emotions. This article/journal/study states that there are intrinsic and extrinsic factors that help develop self-control over emotions and such self-control begins developing during the first years of life.
What do you think? Is such evidence proof that Sartre is correct? Do you think that facticity still plays a role, despite the proof of the ability to control emotions?
www.education.umd.edu/EDHD/faculty/Fox/publications/31.pdf
I, too, agree with Sartre. When I feel sad, if I don't dwell on it and begin to do something else, it won't be long before I realize that I'm no longer feeling so upset. If I'm angry at someone, I sometimes have to remind myself that I should still be angry, as otherwise that emotion will gradually slip away.
ReplyDeleteWhile there certainly is a factual, chemical aspect to how emotion works, we learned in my psychology class that mood disorders such as depression are actually better treated with therapy alone than with a combination of medication and therapy. This does not seem to support the idea that emotions are a part of our facticity.
I agree, as well with both you and Sartre. Often the emotions of individuals are the result of a mindset rather than the product of a physical or external influence.
ReplyDeleteThis can be easily seen in the example of a person experiencing intense anguish and then focusing on something else entirely causing the anguish to become existent only as a memory.
However, I do have to wonder if this itself is not an act of bad faith. To deny oneself of a feeling present -- to transcend that emotion which seems to consume a being -- seems to tread the line toward lying to oneself. If a person were to be an emotion in such a way that it, at least in that moment, can be said to define them; would it not be in bad faith to transcend that feeling by claiming it to be the product only of the mind -- and not a component of one's facticity?