Friday, November 4, 2011

In Defense of Philosophical Suicide

After talking about Albert Camus and the philosophy of the absurd on Tuesday, I got to thinking about Camus’ critique of committing philosophical suicide. Camus spends a lot of time discussing what facing the absurd looks like and even gives us an example of the absurd hero: Sisyphus. What he does not do (at least in the short reading we did) is give an argument for why committing philosophical suicide is wrong. In fact, I would argue that when one encounters the absurd, it is actually the task of philosophy to try to interpret and understand. I recognize that the absurd qua absurd cannot be understood, but perhaps we can at least do the best we can.

Through philosophy, we can interrogate and question our world. We can elevate some parts of that world and subordinate others. We can learn to navigate and live in that world. Perhaps most importantly, we can communicate with others who both inhabit our world and encounter their world in a similar way that we do. When encountering these others, I can share parts of my world and the other can share parts of hers. Through language, we can come to a consensus (or at least a provisional contentious about certain aspects of this world.

It seems like the absurd man can’t do any of these things. He revolts, is passionate and free, but he cannot share anything about his life with anyone else. When the absurd man embraces the absurdity, he enters into a solipsistic world. He relinquishes all ground by which he can judge value because he rejects the possibility that value could exist. He cannot relate what he is doing or how he is feeling because he cannot connect with the other.

One consequence (perhaps unintended) of taking the absurd man’s position is a kind of extreme relativism. All values are essentially the same because the absurd man has no basis upon which to judge them. I can just as easily hold the belief A as I can not-A. In fact, the absurd man would have no objection to both A and not-A being true. He is not as lazy in his relativism as the lazy relativist, but there seem to be a lot of similarities between them.

3 comments:

  1. I think you bring up a very interesting point about the danger of certain interpretations of existentialist thought. I do not feel that this concern is unique, but rather could be applied to the entire movement. There is always a danger is denying the existence of universal meanings to subjects and it can cause someone who may be less adept to consider the entirety of being relative.

    Admittedly, this would most likely produce a similar feeling to the angst that is intrinsic to much existential philosophies. However, it would not be with the understanding that is brought about by this branch of philosophy, and the hopeless relativist would forever be unable to make sense, resolve, or understand Camus' instance on the acceptance of the absurdity he creates with this view. He in no way manages to achieve the benefits of thinkers like Camus because he is ignorant to them.In short, it is all the subjectivism with none of the significance.

    In the application of this idea to Camus, he does toe the line toward this idea. However, he demands the certain limits are placed in order to allow meaning to foster -- you must revolt against the absurdity of existence, not become absurd yourself.

    ReplyDelete
  2. I agree with you Ben, accepted the absurd for solely being absurd without any inquisitory efforts or at least thoughts of trying to understand it seems very lazy and more of an escape route to allow his idea of the absurd to exist. Sure, it may be impossible to understand the absurd in its true form, but it does not dismiss us from inquiry about it nor attempts to understand it.

    ReplyDelete
  3. I wonder if Camus would accept the implications that you say his philosophy implies. They are very good points, and the implied sort of moral/value relativism seems to both be dangerous and still follow naturally from the position he describes. I wonder though if he would really advocate such a position or if he is merely trying to raise awareness as to the ultimate grounds for philosophical understanding. My comment here will not attempt to argue positively in either direction; I do think that the implications you delineate seem valid (and pose a danger to his philosophy) and are worth examining.

    It's hard to really say anything positive about Camus's philosophy. It certainly appeals to the Absurd for its anti-system-building nature. It looks like it is your belief that philosophy is meant to build our mutual concepts so that we may more effectively understand the world and communicate with each other. You also say that the absurd man makes his world "a solipsistic world" where value cannot exist. The conclusion seems valid, even though it is not stressed by Camus. Camus's seems to want to reveal that regarding these philosophical systems as genuine parts of reality amounts to philosophical suicide. But the alternative, you say, seems even more unappealing. I'm curious if some middle ground could be attained where we could create a systematic understanding of the world while at the same time recognizing (and I suppose, revolting) that the world is still an indifferent place. I wonder if Camus would be opposed to such a project -- otherwise he seems forced to accept the relativist position that you describe.

    ReplyDelete

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.