Freedom as a Limitation of Freedom

I found our discussion about Sartre's definition of freedom to be a little troubling. In an attempt to understand this definition, we ended up separating Sartre's definition from what has become the modern notion of freedom. That is, we differentiated the concept of freedom as the mere ability to imagine any project we may conceive from the more contemporary notion of freedom as the fulfillment and fruition of our will. Sartre does this, I believe, in an attempt to expand the boundaries of our freedom, which he does through his ideas concerning the "brute fact" of an object vs. our imposition of adversity: if objects simply exist objectively, and it is merely our our personal decision on a subjective project that in turn defines the object as an imposition or not, then essentially there exists no objectively existing impediments or limitations. I am inclined to agree with our ability and propensity to define objects as they are related to the project in which they are involved. However, I believe this concept of freedom, as it posits the extending existence of an object solely in the mind, actually limits our human freedom; freedom becomes restricted to the imagination alone, and is not able to be expressed through physical attempts, because then we would set up objects as impediments by our decision to act on an individual project. But in our attempt to not create these impediments, we are limited not only in what we can achieve but also in what we can conceive: in order to not create an impediment as they are defined in our mind, we cannot conceive of projects that cannot be fulfilled; if we exercise our "freedom" in this way, we necessarily create these impediments, which Sartre claims is the real barrier to our freedom. However, these limitations arise out of the very exercise of our freedom. In this circular manner, it would appear that the creation of impediments is inescapable and not an expression of freedom at all. In this way, Sartre's definition of freedom actually becomes itself an impediment to freedom. What does this inescapable quality of freedom do to our conception of human existence as the essence of our freedom? Are we actually free to define ourselves and our situation in the way that we would choose? This question has huge implication on the idea of bad faith: is bad faith in fact possible given that freedom does not seem wholly capable of transcendence? Or does this concept actually strengthen the concept of bad faith, by defining the manner in which bad faith is an improper use of our ability to transcend the situation; in fact, the we do not maintain the ability to transcend at all...