In our discussion of Nietzsche, we focused a great deal on explaining how the strong cannot act with weakness, nor can the weak act with strength. To ask either to do this is to ask them to act falsely. No one can act in a way that is contrary to what they are. We talked through the idea that this is true because there really is no separating will from the effect of will; basically, there is no difference between the nature of a person and the nature of their actions. The birds of prey have no other option than to act as birds of prey – the mere thought is absurd.
Of course, Nietzsche also explains that these ideas have changed. No longer are strength and power reflective of morality. Instead, meekness is considered the moral ideal. This means that the strong are expected to display weakness, even though that may be contrary to their inherent nature. Luckily, this is sort of a non-issue for each of us personally. We are the weak and, understandably, have no problem acting as such. This does however create some hypothetical quandaries.
For example, this idea that one cannot choose to act other than they are is at odds with our reading from earlier in the week, an excerpt from Dostoevsky that discusses the fundamental difference between determinism and freedom. We defined the assertion of freedom as choice. If we hold this to be true, what does that mean for Nietzsche’s idea that one cannot choose to be anything other than they are?
Does this suggest that if we had stuck with our original moral ideals, we would be living in a determined world? If this were true, we would be forced to conclude that our existence has no purpose. It would entirely negate the concept of free will that most of us believe in by necessity. The concept of a life without purpose is a maddening one.
This leads me to think that perhaps we revolted against the set aristocratic morals because the alternative holds frightening implications. By changing moral standards to hold weakness as a value, we created the idea of a choice that does not naturally exist. We created the idea that strong can choose to act weakly and that the weak can choose to assert strength. By creating the idea that there exists a choice we are separating our will from our actions, and granting ourselves free will. My question is whether this is a false free will.
Naturally, I would want to say that free will does, in fact, naturally exist. However, we can't really say that if we think about Dostoevsky and Nietzche.
ReplyDeleteI understand that Nietzche argues that you can't be anything more than what you are. This view does fit into Dostoevsky's argument between determinism and freedom.
I think that free will does exist despite Nietzche's point because even though you can't escape you're natural characteristics (of being weak, strong, etc.), you have the choice on how to embrace such characteristics. Hence, you can make your own choices about how to use strength, weakness, good health, etc. to your advantage or disadvantage (although, we already know that individuals naturally make choices based on whether it is advantageous).
I don't see this as a false free will.
I agree with Nietzsche's assertion that one cannot decide to be anything other than what they are, but I don't think this makes free will an impossibility.
ReplyDeleteIt makes sense that the strong cannot act with weakness, nor the weak with strength, but it's not an either/or type of choice. It's not as if the only two options are apples and oranges, representing strength and weakness respectively, and each individual must pick one or the other according to his/her predetermined characteristics. A strong person still can choose from a variety of strong actions, and a weak person can choose from a variety of weak actions. I don't think being true to one's character proves that free will is nonexistent.