Calculative Thinking & The Averaging of the Da-sein

“For nowadays we take in everything in the quickest and cheapest way.” This quote from Heidegger’s Discourse on Thinking goes a long way toward defining modern civilization. Our economies, our relationships (think of the shallow efficiency of Facebook), and our ways of gathering information are all becoming broader and more shallow. We are obsessed with efficiency to a point that is damaging. Websites like Wikipedia give us knowledge in the cheapest and easiest way possible. This sort of instant knowledge has its defects, namely that we “know” things without ever having to participate in the learning process. This is the meanest sort of knowledge, because it does not require any understanding of the subject. When knowledge is so easy to obtain, people lose their ability to really think. We have become what Heidegger calls calculative thinkers. This means we are concerned with hard fact, definites, and linear thinking. This means we no longer stop to think meditatively, to reflect on what something means rather than what it is. 

Heidegger’s Being and Time is a discussion of Da-sein. Our Da-sein is our essence, and is defined as the being which has its own question Being as a question. Every human is Da-sein, but with our steady loss of meditative thinking, the question of our Being consumes us less and less. This leads to what Heidegger calls a “leveling down” of the Da-sein. The leveling down of the Da-sein is a direct result of our “publicness”; as we said in class, human existence is, necessarily, a coexistence. Our “being-with-others” requires that each of “the others” be considered until they are no longer distinct individuals, but part of a singular “they”. This creates an averageness and dilutes the Da-sein. The creation of this “they” serves to divert responsibility. As Heidegger says, “Everyone is the other and no one is himself.” In practical terms, this means that if everyone is responsible, no one is responsible. The creation of “they” undermines our individual identity. By abandoning responsibility, one gives up their free will. Without free will, one loses their individual-ness. It is because of this loss of individual-ness that the Da-sein ceases to be Da-sein. 

So, what do you think? Is the averaging of the Da-sein a result of our increasingly calculative thinking? Or does the leveling down of the Da-sein unrelated to our current society?

Heidegger's philosophy retains a complexity that has already been noted in class several times. However, what has not been touched on is the consistency of ideas that, in fact, link the entire Heidegger reading together – despite the constant presence of confusion and appearance of contradiction at first glance.

Heidegger’s philosophy is characterized by interweaving of his concepts and the terminology he uses to define them. At the core of Heidegger’s philosophy is the idea of “Da-sein” – the being with its own Being as an issue. This being inherently exist in the world, and cannot be separated from others because its condition of “being-there-too” with others. Da-sein cannot be thought of as ever isolated from others because the two are intrinsically linked. However, it can be distinguished from them (Sec 26).

Though, Da-sein is absorbed into the world, there is no “universal subject” that is composed of multiple Da-sein. There is, however, the presence of the “they” – or “Das Mam” – which has the potential to cause Da-sein to lose itself. It is possible at any point in which a Da-sein is “being-with-one-another” – such as in public transportation. The Da-sein becomes a part of the “the being of the others” and it can become so that the others become less distinct, and then Da-sein loses its ability to be its own being; it becomes ruled by the they. This process is known as “levelling down”, in which the Da-sein loses what makes it distinguishable – it does everything the same way “they” do(Sec 27).

It is this blind conformity that Heidegger rallies against. He referred to this as “publicness” and it was something he found to be unwanted. “Publicness” was to limit the possibilities of being and to work within in the same structure as “they” do (Sec 27). While apart of the public, the Da-sein “flees from though.” It does not have its Being as a concern, and its thoughts become purely calculative – focus of facts, computations, and practicality – rather than the typical meditative quality – reflective of experience – they are intended to have.

The concept of thoughtlessness versus reflection is a consistent theme of Heidegger. He especially stresses it in his “Discourse on Thinking,” and the Da-sein is defined by meditative thinking. Therefore, not only are the ideas and complex thoughts all linked, but remain within the very same realm. There is a brilliance in the use of repetitious terminology to link all the concepts.

As confusing as Heidegger’s syntax can be, I found an appreciation for this coherence of thought which many great thinkers do not maintain over several works, and it did raise a point of interest about not just the material but existence. Perhaps, all that which composes a being, such as the Da-sein, is not a disconnected collage of random character traits but a network of influences and characteristics that may be distinguished but cannot be removed from one another. Or it may just be we are just jumbled sums of experience up to this point.

Slaves of the they

I have found these particular passages from Heidegger (and the subsequent explanation of these passages in class) have proposed some interesting ideas about our existence. Particularly, Heidegger’s ideas about the modes in which das sein can be the they. The idea of distantiality is essentially the fact that we compare and measure ourselves with others. As we do not want to appear too extreme or different we suppress this distantiality and the more we suppress it the more average we become. This idea of averaging, which causes the leveling down of society, makes us become more and more like each other. The leveling down of society is an especially frightening idea. To think that the bar is lower than it potentially could be is points to how much control the they has over us.

Social media, Wikipedia, google news, the list goes on. We are all, to steal a term from Nietzsche, slaves to the they. If I am making a false statement by saying that someone please correct me, but if I understand it correctly this is the way it sounds. The they is relieving just about everyone of responsibility and individuality. Without responsibility or individuality can Das Sein exhist. I, for one, do not believe it can. If we rely too heavily on the they we risk losing the Das Sein which is the one thing that differentiates us from every other animal on the planet.

Can we, as individuals, really exist as individuals if we all so frequently participate in the they? In my opinion, modern Western society has turned us into sheepish slaves of the they.

Dasein vs Das Man

Disclaimer: Heidegger still confuses me somewhat, so I may have gotten something wrong here. Please let me know!

When Dasein gives itself over to das Man, it assimilates into the "They." Instead of acting as an individual, one defaults to the guidelines provided by the They, adhering to those norms, thinking in that same line of thought, trying to remain close to the average. It is in reference to the They when someone says something like "one should get eight hours of sleep per day" or "they say breakfast is the most important meal of the day." Because such statements are attributed to the ever-ambiguous They, whoever speaks them is no longer responsible for their meaning or accuracy. In these ways, the individual disappears inside the They, and loses that which makes him Dasein.

I feel that this is an occurrence that is all too prevalent in our society. Individuals do not wish to be seen as such, but would rather submerge themselves within the whole of society. Even on a smaller scale, everyone feels the need to attribute themselves to a certain group or label, as though they have no self unless it can be defined by others. Deviation from the norm is looked upon with disdain, dissuading others from possible future deviations. Adherence to popular trends in slang, fashion, music, etc. is to be admired. Every individual becomes a part of the They. As Heidegger describes it, this way of living is inauthentic.

To return to authenticity and Dasein, one needs to free himself from the constraints that das Man places upon him, and regain control of and responsibility for his choices. This would also return the significance that human experience has been robbed of due to the "leveling-down" found in publicness.

However, it is foolish to think that anyone can fully and interminably avoid das Man. If everyone was Dasein all the time, would society as we know it even be able to exist? Nevertheless, the extent to which some immerse themselves in das Man is far too great, when the most significant experience is had through Dasein.

The Essence of Da-Sein and its Implications

I'd like to spend my post taking a second look at the first proposition under "The Theme of the Analytic of Da-Sein." We discussed it in class already, but if I remember correctly we moved onto the next topic without having a clear picture of what Heidegger expresses here. Dr. Johnson said though that this claim of his is actually quite revolutionary, so I thought it deserved some more analytic attention.

As far as we know, only human beings fall under the category of Da-Sein, that is, the being which has its own Being as an issue. Although we have this criterion, it does not explicate what is essential to Da-Sein. In Heidegger's words, "The 'essence' of this being [Da-Sein] lies in its to be" (119), which of course is a difficult phrase to comprehend. I think Patrick got us on the right track when he said that this relates to the "existence precedes essence" mantra of the existentialists. We contrasted the essence of Da-Sein with the essence of any other ordinary object, e.g., a table. (For the sake of simplicity, we will leave animals out of consideration for now.) The table cannot be said to have its essence within its being. Rather, a table is so because it is constructed by people who have the form, or the essence, of the table in mind, meaning that the essence is prior to the table's existence. To put it another way, and the way that Dr. Johnson once characterized it, the table's being does not depend on its constant actualization of being a table. It simply is so because it is. The same, however, cannot be said for human beings. We do constantly actualize our being. Whatever, or more appropriately whoever, we are does depend on our making it so. But since our making it so presupposes that we are there to make it, it must be said that our existence is prior to our essence. (Sartre explains this idea in a similar manner in Existentialism is a Humanism.)

Let's take a second to evaluate the claim that's being made here and see what kind of conditions are necessary for this claim to be true. Earlier philosophers like Aquinas and Aristotle probably did not see humans as having essences fulfilled through one's existence. Rather, humans fell under the category of "rational animal" which inhered somehow in the cosmos. This usually implies a sort of theological or teleological worldview, where humans fulfill their pre-existing essences through their own existence. This does not seem to be the case for the existentialists. Heidegger's thought seems to extend from Nietzsche's nihilist stance that the world is really just a chaotic place and that the perceived orderly universe is just an illusion. Indeed, such world conditions seem necessary if we are to make the claim that Da-Sein has its essence in its being. Should we then abandon all teleological viewpoints?


(Footnotes:
I credit Patrick Shade for being a partial source for some ideas expressed in the third paragraph.
If I am misrepresenting existentialist thought or am getting too ahead of myself, please comment and let me know. I've read existentialist literature and writing about existentialism before, but I do admit I have a confused picture of it.)

Heidegger and Sociology

For Heidegger, being in the mode of the they-self is an inauthentic mode of being for Dasein, yet it is a part of Dasein’s average everydayness to be in this mode. Heidegger realizes that we regularly appeal to the ‘they’ as a way of dealing with our everyday lives. This is not something we can get away from. It is part of Dasein’s ontological structure insofar as it is a Being-with-others. While we may be predisposed towards deburdening ourselves by projecting the ‘they’ it is still not an authentic mode of being for Dasein. Dasein is not Dasein when it is in the mode of the they-self because it loses its ‘mineness’. It no longer is for its own Being, but for the Being of the ‘they’.

This projecting of the ‘they’ is very similar to how sociology conceives of the way in which the individual is socially constructed by the group. The sociologist is generally interested in what different societies take to be knowledge as opposed to what knowledge is itself. The basic response is that society is a kind of normalizing force the instructs the individuals about how to act. The simple act of congregating in a group is enough to create a collective ‘moral’ feeling about how one should act.

This kind of naïve social epistemology has always bothered me. Heidegger’s account seems to me to be an accurate and powerful challenge to the idea that the socializing, normalizing force of the ‘they’ is the place one turns to for knowledge, or justification of that knowledge. Has anyone else come up against this problem? I know that this post goes a little outside the scope of this class, but I was wondering if anyone else has taken any sociology classes. In a way, the sociologist is committing the same offence as the lazy relativist, but the sociologist is much more rigorous in her approach. Let me know what you think.

Heidegger's Human

I couldn't help but be struck by what I saw as the contrast between the apparent critique that Heidegger offers of the rationalistic, calculative mode of thinking (which one would seem to identify as the heritage of the Enlightenment) and the manner in which he defines the human being, which seems to me to presuppose or even paraphrase some of the classical Enlightenment concepts of the human.

For example, his very distinction of the difference between data and understanding, between the calculative and meditative varieties of thought, seems to me to be a rephrasing of the arguments of thinkers like Descartes or Kant as to what is unique about human intelligence: namely that we do not merely experience impressions of the world but are able to relate them to one another within conceptual frameworks that provide meaning.

Similarly (as I think I mentioned in class), the defintion of Da-sein as defined by the ability of a being to have its own being (or is it Being?) as a question presupposes the existence of a kind of intelligence capable of asking any question at all, which seems to me to be even more fundamental (chairs don't ask themselves about either being or Being, as far as we know). In summary, I was left feeling as if all of Heidgger's thought was less subversive or revolutionary than one would think. Then again, he was a Nazi.

Am I offbase on all this?

Ascetcism...

In out last class as we continued our discussion of Nietzche and his analogy concerning the slave revolt we came across the word "Asceticism" which was define as the action of "yes-saying" This idea was not really expanded on in the class to the point where I understood what it really meant so I wanted to find out how this ties in to our discussion.

By definition Asceticism is a life style of abstinence from multiple worldly pleasure with the purpose of pursing religious or spiritual goal. In the christian and Indian Religion it serves as a teaching of salvation and liberation-a transformation for the mind and soul A way to create a freedom in an individual's life.

Nietzche divides the meaning up of what asceticism is in 6 different parts, individualizing it for 6 different types of people: the artist, philosopher, women, philosophical causalities, priests and saints. He goes into detail as to how each individual type experiences and how the ascetic ideal affects them. After reading sources on this I tried to come up with a meaning of what Nietzche was saying and I came up with this definition. It is the yes-saying of our willingness to test our limits, our willingness to struggle to achieve full power over ourselves and possibly nature.
But what makes this ideal life affirming and is this what he means by the birds of prey not being able to assert themselves.

http://www.themystica.com/mystica/articles/a/asceticism.html

Lack of Necessity as an Indication of Will

As we studied in greater depth the meaning and intent of Nietzsche’s allegory in paragraph 13 this week, I became concerned with the idea of determinism that such an argument implies, that is, the concept that the subject cannot be separated from the action, which essentially eliminates the existence of choice; if each person is imbued with particular qualities, the nature of which cannot be expressed as anything other than the essentials of that quality then, according to Nietzsche, we are necessarily unable to choose our actions, a belief in which illustrates our distortion of this fact and acceptance of the slave morality.

His chosen allegory certainly accepts this fact and implies a natural hierarchy that is independent of societal or moral constructions; it simply is what it is. However, it is this focus on the natural aspect of the relationship that I find limiting to his argument and, therefore, allows for the inclusion of will or choice. His metaphor has a naturalistic quality because of its reliance upon animal relationships; nature implies impulse, which is driven by necessity. For example, the reason that the birds attack and feed on the lambs is not simply because they are strong and must find an outlet for their strength, but that they must have something to eat, as is required by their nature. In this sense, the “what is” is dominated and governed by necessity. This remains consistent with Nietzsche’s point: the birds cannot help but to exercise their strength; it is their natures, but only insofar as nature makes it necessary to live.

This concept of necessity may have parallels in human society. For instance in economic situations: the existence of an elite, rich upper-class necessarily requires the existence of a poor lower-class. However, human existence is no longer completely governed by naturalistic boundaries, as defined by mere necessity. Modern society has created the idea of luxury beyond the necessities simply required to live. Therefore, there exist moments where we are not acting according to the laws of necessity. If that particular action is not required for us to live, how is it that we can conceive of acting on it? Where necessity does not drive, the absence of any guidance implies a choice is required. We can act one way or the other because neither action is necessary. This seems to allow for at least the need, if not existence of human will. And the existence of choice implies that a right or wrong decision has the potential of being made, which implies the existence of an inherent morality. If the strong man walks outside and punches the weaker man in the face, the absence of necessity would lead us to believe that such an action was inherently wrong; we would not accept the claim that the strong man was simply exercising his strength because he could not do otherwise…

In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche asserts that the Creditor-Debtor relationship is “the oldest and most primitive relationship among persons there is,” that it existed since the very first examples of human-to-human interactions.The earliest relationships showed “feelings of exchange, contract, guilt, right, obligation, [and] compensation.” Out of the interaction of these terms, the modern idea of a promise was created. A promise is essentially a theoretical exchange of goods (one party simply giving one's word to the other), often involving a contract, obligations, and with failed promises, guilt.

During our discussion on Thursday, I found it interesting that we could not come up with a proper term for the failure to follow through with a promise. Such an instance is not necessarily a lie, but rather an overestimation of one's command of the future.Typically when a promise is made, the promiser has every intention of following through with it. If the promiser never had any such intention, it would in fact be a lie and could not be termed a promise at all. As was stated, the future is so uncertain that it almost seems foolish to promise something when you are unable to ensure, with absolute certainty, that the action will be completed.

Suppose we make a distinction between an promise unfulfilled and a promise broken, the former being a failure due extenuating circumstances and the latter being a failure due to an individual's choice. From an objective standpoint, it seems unfair to punish someone for a promise unfulfilled because the failure was outside of his or her control (although one could also argue that the individual should avoid making promises that cannot be kept). The notion of being forgiven for unfulfilled promises becomes even trickier when applied to the present day creditor-debtor relationship. People buy houses, cars, and even furniture, all the while thinking that they will be able to keep up with the monthly payments. Initially they are successful, but eventually taxing circumstances (no pun intended) get the best of them and finances get tied up in other things. Loans fail to be paid off, and then legal actions must be taken. Typically people do not choose to skip bill payments for the thrill of it; if a payment is skipped, it's because the funds are lacking. Thus the promise of their payment is unfulfilled rather than broken, but because they are bound by contract, it cannot be brushed aside or forgiven. It seems a great deal of financial woes would be resolved if people made a habit of making purchases with currency rather than with promises.

Slavish Morality is Natural

In class this week we discussed Nietzsche’s account on the origin of morals. Nietzsche argues that there “noble” individuals devised a moral system of “good and bad” by indicating that which was “good.” Those individuals seen as “weak” or “bad” (priestly) soon developed a system of “good and evil,” which replaced the former system. The moral system of evaluating things as “good” or “evil” deals with the association of “weak” with “good.”

On Thursday we discussed how this moral system applies to human nature. In the second essay of The Genealogy of Morals, the origin of guilt is said to originate from the “most primitive relationship among persons there is, in the relationship between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor” (88). We said in class that this type of creditor-debtor relationship makes sense because human beings have a tendency to measure, value, and evaluate.

The concept that we use the slavish moral system in all, or almost all, situations makes sense. I do not understand, or more so agree, with Nietzsche’s view that the elite, noble class should rule with their value system of “good and bad.” If the noble class was to rule with their value system, would our concept of guilt even exist? As of the system of “good and evil” in place now, we compare ourselves and others using the system as an evaluation tool. If we did not have such a system in place at all, would humans have evaluated things? Would humans have different characteristics?

I think that if the slavish morality system was not in place, then there might not be a sense of guilt, since we would not be comparing ourselves to a system. Rather, everything would just be assigned as “good” or “bad” and there would not be anything more to it. Hence, Jesus would not have been seen as a redeemer because lack of guilt would make it so that there is nothing to him to redeem from all of humanity.

In other words, I think that the slavish morality system is natural and necessary for life. It coincides with the natural characteristics that humans have (i.e. the tendency for human beings to measure, value, and evaluate).

What do you think? Do you think that the slavish morality is necessary? Do you think Nietzsche is right in saying that the elite class should dominate with their value system? Would guilt exist if this was the case (elite dominating)?

The Strongest of The Weak

And the winner is....

Jesus?

How can Jesus be the strongest of the weak?

Nietzche explains the origins of our modern value system by first explaining what it was before. He says that what predated our current system was a system that gave value to the strong and the noble. It makes sense. The people that were originally on top of the natural hierarchy were the ones that assumed the roles of "value-makers". The things that were noble and strong were considered "good", and obviously, the things that were not strong became "weak". But somewhere down the line (centuries later I assume), a priestly caste used God and eventually Jesus as a catalyst or a means for this reciprocated value system. Unlike the aristocratic morality system, this system treated the strong (master) as evil and the weak (the slaves) as good. Nietzche explains that this is natural for the weak to not want to accept this faith.

So what happens? The priestly caste devises a plan to separate the good and bad by making it a choice to be weak or strong. This illusion makes it a choice to be strong or weak by completely ignoring the natural hierarchy (the natural deterministic characteristics). By saying this, you can essentially place blame on the strong for being strong and the weak for being weak. Thus, creating good and evil. Essentially, it is a struggle between determinism and free will (reminds me of Dostoevsky).

So how does this relate to Jesus? Well according to Nietzche, Jesus would be considered the strongest of the weak. He is the one who rallied the weak to change the moral system. Well, I question that that means that He is weak. I believe that there is a separation from the church and Jesus. The priestly caste is life-denying. They assume that Jesus would call the strong and noble evil, while in fact I do not see that to be the case. First, Jesus is considered a God - a figure that is beyond all things. He is life-affirming. Unlike the priestly caste who condemn the strong, Jesus does not even pays them attention. To me those are the attributes of a strong person.

It is my understanding that Jesus preached about choices and decisions and that he gave us free will to choose between the good and bad. But did he live his life that way. I argue that he does not. He lives his life beyond that. He does not react to the strong. He does not react to his oppression. No, he accepts it whole-heartedly. That makes him strong. Yes, he preached about free-will and choices, but that is not how he lived his life. He is life affirming and a strong individual.

Tell me what you think.

The natural world

What is man kinds place in the natural world?

We seem to create reasons for why we are here and reasons for keeping order. It is a common trend that human beings seek order rather then chaos and anarchy. Nietzche argues that before there was the slave morality in power that the master mentality was in place; the good decieded what was good and were running rampant around the world. Human beings naturally don't like being seen as being lesser of another so a system was created, values and morality.

These are things that should exist no matter what. If we follow Nietzche's thoughts of humans in the natural world then we are no better then animals surging on emotion and lust. He decrees that life affirming ideas are the way to go, but it is my opionion that the slave morality is also life affirming, all life.

And has there ever really been a time in life when the good aka strong truly didn't have morals. The answer is no, while the strong have always lead they have not always been cruel. The earliest accounts of history and society/civilzation in general have never been promoters of this mind set that Nietzche proposes. The Summarians and Chinese people both had dynasties and kingdoms. Humarabi's (Sorry spelling lol) code, an eye for an eye. In Gilgamesh the ancient king express' benevolence and he is supposed to be the most powerful man to have ever walked the earth. This are cultures that existed long before the jews predating them by a 1000 years and perhaps even more.

I believe that the "Slave" morality has always been the main course of action and Nietzche is seriously wrong about the human nature. And even if I'm wrong what kind of meaningless world would we live in if the old good/strong had true power?

Nietzsche and Free Will

In our discussion of Nietzsche yesterday we took a close look at the parable of the lamb and the bird of prey. We understood it to basically mean that the strong are strong, the weak are weak, and it makes no sense for one to ask the strong to be weak and vice versa. It is in fact the slave morality that invents the conception of responsibility. Before, the strong simply were strong. They did not need to give an account if their strength, particularly to the weak. After the slave revolt, the strong held accountable for their strength.

This idea of being held accountable made me think of our discussion on Tuesday about freewill and determinism. From what we saw in Notes from Underground, the human being is essentially free. She resists every formula suggested to dictate her behavior. She will act irrationality simply to avoid becoming predictable. Does Nietzsche agree with this conception of the human as being free? If we look at the example above, it appears that he would say that human beings are very much determined. Those who act strong are the strong. They can’t help themselves or do anything about it. It is only after the slave revolt that they are given a ‘choice’ by the slaves. Nietzsche seems to be insinuating that this is actually a false choice. We have no real free will to choose.

It is strange, then, that Nietzsche is so interested in the ‘will to power’ or even a ‘will’ to anything. If Nietzsche is in fact a determinist, what could willing something actually do? One could possibly will some life-affirming principle, but one cannot will a change in one’s nature (i.e. insofar as one is strong or weak, etc.). The ‘willing’ involved in the life-affirmation process is not the robust sense of will that we usually think of. However, what we might consider a ‘robust’ account of will may just be slave morality’s corruption of the understanding of will. Perhaps a genealogy of the concept of will (along the same lines and the genealogy of the concepts of ‘good and bad’ and ‘good and evil’) might be in order.

I’d like to leave y’all with this question: Does Nietzsche provide a freewill or determinist account of the human being? Or are such categories simply a function of the slave morality and as such not appropriate to use?

Does Free Will Exist?

In our discussion of Nietzsche, we focused a great deal on explaining how the strong cannot act with weakness, nor can the weak act with strength. To ask either to do this is to ask them to act falsely. No one can act in a way that is contrary to what they are. We talked through the idea that this is true because there really is no separating will from the effect of will; basically, there is no difference between the nature of a person and the nature of their actions. The birds of prey have no other option than to act as birds of prey – the mere thought is absurd.

Of course, Nietzsche also explains that these ideas have changed. No longer are strength and power reflective of morality. Instead, meekness is considered the moral ideal. This means that the strong are expected to display weakness, even though that may be contrary to their inherent nature. Luckily, this is sort of a non-issue for each of us personally. We are the weak and, understandably, have no problem acting as such. This does however create some hypothetical quandaries.

For example, this idea that one cannot choose to act other than they are is at odds with our reading from earlier in the week, an excerpt from Dostoevsky that discusses the fundamental difference between determinism and freedom. We defined the assertion of freedom as choice. If we hold this to be true, what does that mean for Nietzsche’s idea that one cannot choose to be anything other than they are?

Does this suggest that if we had stuck with our original moral ideals, we would be living in a determined world? If this were true, we would be forced to conclude that our existence has no purpose. It would entirely negate the concept of free will that most of us believe in by necessity. The concept of a life without purpose is a maddening one.

This leads me to think that perhaps we revolted against the set aristocratic morals because the alternative holds frightening implications. By changing moral standards to hold weakness as a value, we created the idea of a choice that does not naturally exist. We created the idea that strong can choose to act weakly and that the weak can choose to assert strength. By creating the idea that there exists a choice we are separating our will from our actions, and granting ourselves free will. My question is whether this is a false free will. 

Consider the Middle Ground

There are quite a few points that Nietzsche argues with which I must admit leave me utterly bewildered. Neither the slave nor master classifications are intrinsically superior – despite their syntax – (though it has already been argued that he has a bias to the “strong,” “noble” class) but is it not the weak class that provided for the creation and reassessment of values? Yes, there was rationalism and thinking that alludes to the enlightened philosophers within the content of the essay – which from this context Nietzsche disapproves; however, is it not the slave revolt – the reaction to the “good” – that opens up the dialogue to existential examinations?

Though the slave revolt is described as a simple inverse of the previous principles, it still changed those values – technically to the other extreme. Does that not also mean that it allows for a grey area for which philosophical thought and questions can maneuver freely?

It seems that Nietzsche is criticizing the whole affair as pointless because the good are those who really “live” within the moment – saying “yes” to life – as opposed to the slaves who deny themselves. However, that seems to say no to the very concept of exploring and relationships within one’s own existence – a reference back to Kierkegaard, yes, but still a major part of existentialist thought.

I feel as if I simply have the wrong interpretation, but what would seem to help define the truly existential would be the one who lives in both the master and slave mentalities – having the two battling inside of them in an ever changing hierarchy. Caught in that anxious, undefined no-man’s-land a single individual would find it possible to contemplate the extent of his being to an almost limitless end.

Feel free to correct me, if I am in error. Thanks.

Breaking Free of the Rational World

Dostoevsky declares that man's most advantageous advantage, for which he would forsake all else, is free will. He says that the exertion of free will preserves our individuality, and is a "manifestation of all life" (45). This is why he so opposes the idea of having a perfectly orderly, rational world: everything would already more or less be assigned to its own position and path, leaving little room for personal choice. This correlates closely with our discussion of freedom versus determinism.

In a pre-determined world, nothing seems to hold any significance. When there is only a single permissible path for one to follow, any value that could have been attributed to its experiences is stripped; if there is not a true choice, nor can there be an attributed judgment of character or morality. Thus, in a deterministic world, there can be no moral values, since no one can make any moral or immoral choices in the first place.

Although the version that Dostoevsky gives of this world (there is choice, but humanity as a whole only acts rationally) is a bit less extreme, I could not stand to live within either experience. I would provide proof to his assertion that a human is "a creature that walks on two legs and is ungrateful" (46) in that I would readily give up a flawlessly planned rational life for a moment of my own foolish freedom.

In fact, in a sense, I feel like I am currently experiencing such an irrational inclination. While our modern world is still far from the restriction of Dostoevsky's model, there remains an expected route: go to school, get good grades, go to college, get a well-paying professional job, get married, have children, and retire to Florida. Although there are certainly choices within that series of expectations, I am already unsatisfied with being confined to such a set path. My desire to express freedom of choice creates within me a highly irrational urge to abandon school and travel the world, consequences be damned.

This is just one instance of evidence proving Dostoevsky's claim that free will is man's most advantageous advantage. An overly-structured world breeds restlessness and the urge to deviate, even if such deviation could be disadvantageous overall.

What happened to the original "strong" class?

Friedrich Nietzsche, in On the Genealogy of Morality, sets his views on where our present state of morals comes from. In the beginning of humanity, the good were those people who exhibited all the characteristics of being “good,” such as health, power, strength, wealth, beauty, and things of that nature. The “bad” class had the opposites of these virtues. Nietzsche said the good acted this way because it was in their nature, and that their actions and decisions were not chosen upon, but acted that way because it was the only way the good could naturally act. The good did not think about the lower, “bad” class, as it was simply something that did not concern them. Eventually, over time, the “bad” people, or the slave class, got sick of their status and reversed the role of these classes, by stating that the good class in fact had a moral choice about their actions, and chose something that was harmful to the lower class, and made them an oppressive, moral evil. Nietzsche says that this idea of a choice between acting as the good or bad is a false choice, and it is solely natural to act either way, there is no moral decision making involved in the process. This essentially reversed the roles of the moral system into what we have today.

I find a problem with Nietzsche’s argument in that it seems to take away are perceived sense of free will and decision making. While it is true that some people are naturally stronger than others and some are weaker, it does not mean that they follow in accordance with their nature every time. If we are to be reduced to our base state of our instinct and act naturally according to whatever it is in our nature, then it seems as if we do have free will or any choice in the decision making process. This also destroys the whole sense of morality in our conscience today, which is what Nietzsche aims to do, as everyone perceives themselves as being moral, and having the ability to make conscience decisions about their actions. If Nietzsche’s ideas about the reversal of the classes and nature of the slave and the strong class, does this mean that all the Nietzsche-ian strong no longer exist if everyone believes that they have a moral choice, therefore making everyone part of the slave class? Or is it that even these strong at this point can act as the strong, they are just falsely believing in their choice and their inner strength leads them to act a certain way regardless of their perceived free will?

The Universe in Fecal Terms

Ever seen those bumper stickers with the pithy message reminding us that, pardon the expression, "Shit Happens"? Thucydides gave us a slightly more refined formulation of the same sentiment, "The strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must." Either way, the underlying thought seems a fair description of the Nietzchean view of the world we live in. What's more, in a descriptive sense our friend Friedrich has a point about the nature of the universe as we find it; much of what we see in the cosmos indicates an indifference to us, and our attempts to impose order on nature often say more about our need to make sense of our surroundings than any real rationality inherent in our world.

Nietzsche is perceptive, too, in linking the otherworldly value system (Judeo-Christian morality) that rejects purely naturalistic values to those individuals who are lacking in precisely those qualities (strength, power, health, etc.) that our status as natural beings forces us to desire. After all, Christianity historically found the greatest purchase among precisely the most down- of ancient society,and the emergence of the Jewish religion is likewise traceable to the history of subjugation of that people.

Clever as it may be, all this is not quite as subversive as it sounds; Christianity, after all, explicitly uses language and concepts such as slavery and self-denial in explaining itself. Nietzsche merely appropriates this language with a sneer. And ultimately, one must ask why the posited "slave revolt" succeeded. I would argue that it derives from the ultimate futility of the naturalistic values of the "aristocratic" morality. Even for the strong, the beautiful, the healthy, existence is ultimately hedged about by factors beyond one's control, and everything ultimately is subject to our mortality. The monotheistic religions, as with other mythological accounts of humanity, attempt to explain the origins of death and imperfection that we see in the physical realm, and furthermore offer means of ultimately countering or even conquering this chaotic reality through spiritual means.

Because of this universal appeal, this is why even those among us who do not accept the theological contentions of revealed religion are usually loath to accept Nietzsche "aristocratic" morality, or interpret the whole of Western tradition with such contempt. We are creatures of natural drives, but we know instinctively that we are not only so. We are uniquely reflective animals capable of thinking about a good life in terms not only of our immediate desires, or even of the good of the collective, but in terms of a kind of dignity that the lambs and birds of prey do not know. In crude terms, we are the one species that decides what to do with our shit.